Double Jeopardy - Declaration of Mistrial Without Consent of Defendant by Schlueter, Carl Grant
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 32 | Number 1
December 1971
Double Jeopardy - Declaration of Mistrial Without
Consent of Defendant
Carl Grant Schlueter
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Carl Grant Schlueter, Double Jeopardy - Declaration of Mistrial Without Consent of Defendant, 32 La. L. Rev. (1971)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol32/iss1/13
NOTES
satisfactory in that it ignores the possibility of a reconciliation
between the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile court system and
the preservation of the individual rights of juveniles. Rehabili-
tation for the guilty, as well as freedom for the innocent, begins
with a fair and accurate determination of the facts." The jury
system both traditionally and practically is the best vehicle to
achieve that beginning. The sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to .. .an impartial jury ...."
Read literally, the clear indication is that all criminally accused
persons shall enjoy that right. The juvenile proceeding has been
classified as criminal in nature in the Gault case so as to deserve
other constitutional protections applicable in criminal proceed-
ings."' Practical arguments which militate against the right to
trial by jury in juvenile proceedings are not so insurmountable
as to preclude its adoption. The Duncan decision, holding that
due process of law necessarily involves the right to jury trial
when the accused faces a significant abridgement of his freedom,
should be particularly applicable to juvenile proceedings where
the child accused of a crime may face a period of confinement
many times longer than the imprisonment that would confront
an adult charged with the same offense. The McKeiver decision,
in creating a lesser standard of due process for juveniles, has ful-
filled an earlier prophetic observation of the Court:
"There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children."' 2
Lawrence Roe Dodd
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-DECLARATION OF MISTRIAL WITHOUT
CONSENT OF DEFENDANT
The defendant was charged in federal district court with
willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax
60. TASK FoRcu REPORT 30 (1967).
61. 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
62. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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returns.' Five of the Government's witnesses were taxpayers
whom the defendant had allegedly aided in preparation of the
returns.. The trial judge concluded that the witnesses had not
been adequately warned of their constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination and that they must be allowed to consult with
their attorneys prior to testifying. To afford them this opportu-
nity, the trial judge discharged the jury and declared a mistrial
on his own motion without the defendant's consent. The case was
set for retrial, but, on a pretrial motion by the defendant, the
same trial judge dismissed the information on the ground of
double jeopardy. On direct appeal by the Government, 2 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
charge. Held, the trial judge, under these circumstances, abused
his discretion in declaring a mistrial on his own motion without
the consent of the defendant, and further prosecution of the de-
fendant for the offense would violate the constitutional guaran-
tee against double jeopardy. United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547
(1971).
The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy,8 one
of the principal constitutional safeguards for a defendant in a
criminal trial, prevents the Government from subjecting the in-
dividual to repeated prosecutions for the same offense. This is
essentially a manifestation of society's awareness of the heavy
personal strain which a criminal trial places on the defendant,
and its corresponding willingness to limit the Government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate society's vital interest in
the enforcement of criminal laws.4 This concern for the rights
of the individual is expressed in Green v. United States, wherein
the United States Supreme Court noted that the policy under-
lying the double jeopardy provision
". .. is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an in-
1. Specifically the defendant was charged with violation of 26 U.S.C. §
7206(2) (1964) and brought to trial in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah.
2. The Criminal Appeals Act (18 U.S.C. 1 3731 (1964)) authorizes direct
appeal by the government to the United States Supreme Court from a dis-
trict court decision sustaining a "motion in bar" when the defendant has not
been put in jeopardy. A defendant's plea of former jeopardy, based on the
district court's prior declaration of a mistrial, constitutes a "motion in bar"
within the meaning of the statute where the dismissal occurred prior to the
impaneling of a second jury.
3. U. S. CONST. amend. V: 1... nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
4. United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971).
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dividual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty."
There are, however, certain occasions where, after the declara-
tion of mistrial, it is appropriate to the sound administration of
justice that the accused be subjected to a second trial.6
The question posed in Jorn is under what circumstances
will retrial be precluded when the initial proceedings are aborted,
prior to verdict, by the declaration of a mistrial without the de-
fendant's consent. The standard which has been uniformly ap-
plied by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing the trial
judge's exercise of discretion in these circumstances is the "mani-
fest necessity" criteria of United States v. Perez.7 There the de-
fendant was brought to trial on a capital offense, and the jury,
being unable to agree, was discharged by the trial judge without
the consent of the defendant. The Court held that retrial of the
defendant did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy
since the discharge, taking all the circumstances into considera-
tion, was manifestly necessary8
In applying the Perez requirement of "manifest necessity,"
5. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
6. "[A] criminal trial is, even in the best circumstances, a complicated
affair to manage. The proceedings are dependent in the first instance on the
most elementary sort of considerations, e.g., the health of the various wit-
nesses, parties, attorneys, jurors, etc., all of whom must be prepared to arrive
at the courthouse at set times. And when one adds the scheduling problems
arising from case overloads, and the sixth amendment's requirement that the
single trial to which the double jeopardy provision restricts the government
be conducted speedily, it becomes readily apparent that a mechanical rule
prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury
without the defendant's consent would be too high a price to pay for the
added assurance of personal security and freedom from government harass-
ment which such a mechanical rule would provide. As the court noted in
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949), 'a defendant's valued right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be
subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end In just
judgments.'" United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554 (1971).
7. 22 U.S. 579 (1824). See United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971);
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S.
364 (1961); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1952); Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684 (1949); Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); Keerl v. Montana,
213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902); Thompson v. United
States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); Sim-
mons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
8. "[IUn all cases of this nature, the law has Invested Courts of justice
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever,
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the-Supreme Court has defined a limited number of situations in
which retrial is permissible. Reprosecution has been permitted
when a mistrial was declared because the jury was unable to
agree,9 when there was the possibility of juror prejudice,10 and
even where a military court martial was discharged due to tac-
tical necessity in the field." It is also clear that retrial is not
prohibited where the discharge is due to physical necessity.' 2
While adhering to the "manifest necessity" doctrine, the
Court has made it clear that the review of a trial judge's declara-
tion of a mistrial is very limited, so that such declaration is not
likely to be questioned in the absence of a clear abuse of the
judge's discretion. This line of reasoning had served to dilute
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and to place
the emphasis on trial administration at the expense of the indi-
vidual rights of the accused. In Gori v. United States5 the ma-
jority held, in effect, that it is the subjective determination of the
trial judge that determines whether there is a manifest necessity
for aborting the proceedings.14 It was felt that a trial judge is in
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there Is a
manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise
be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it
is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to
interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in
capital cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they inter-
fere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all,
they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public
have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion,
rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the Judges, under
their oaths of office." 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824).
9. Id. See also Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U.S. 71 (1902); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).10. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (reprosecutton not
barred where jury discharged because one juror had served on grand jury
indicting defendant); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (reprose-
cution not barred where mistrial declared because letter published in news-
paper rendered juror's Impartiality doubtful).
11. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
12. See note 6 supra.
.13. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
14. "This Court has long favored the rule of discretion in the trial judge
to declare a mistrial and to require another panel to try the defendant If
the ends of justice will be best served . . .and that we have consistently
declined to scrutinize with sharp surveillance the exercise of that discretion."
Id. at 368.
The defendant in Gori was brought to trial in federal district court
on an information charging that he had knowingly received goods stolen in
interstate commerce. The presiding judge declared a mistrial without the
consent 'of the defendant when he apparently adduced that the prosecutor's
line of questioning was likely to inform the jury of other crimes committed
by the accused. The record indicated, however, that the prosecutor did
nothing to instigate the declaration of a mistrial. The mistrial was clearly
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the best position to determine whether to order a mistrial since
"the cold record on appeal" cannot truly reflect "the heated at-
mosphere of trial." Gori also stands for the proposition that the
discharge of the jury without the consent of the defendant, even
if the discharge is unnecessary, still does not trigger double jeo-
pardy where the judge's declaration "benefited" the defendant. 15
It is apparent that under these standards a trial judge had an
almost unbridled discretion to declare a mistrial without the
consent of the defendant, absent a clear showing of bad faith on
the part of either the trial judge or the prosecution in attempt-
ing to secure a more favorable setting for obtaining a conviction
of the defendant.16 In a subsequent case, however, the Court
made it clear that a lack of preparedness on the part of the prose-
cution, such as the inability to locate key prosecution witnesses,
did not ordinarily justify declaring a mistrial without the con-
sent of the defendant. 17
unnecessary, yet the court held that the retrial of the defendant did not
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the trial judge
acted according to his convictions in protecting the rights of the accused.
15. "Suffice that we are unwilling, where it clearly appears that a mis-
trial has been granted In the sole interest of the defendant, to hold that Its
necessary consequence Is to bar all retrial .... We would not thus make
them [federal trial courts] unduly hesitant conscientiously to exercise their
most sensitive judgment-according to their own lights In the immediate
exigencies of trial-for the more effective protection of the criminal accused.
Id. at 369-70.
16. "Judicial wisdom counsels against anticipating.., situations In which
the discretion of the trial judge may be abused and so call for the safe-
guard of the Fifth Amendment-cases in which the defendant would be
harassed by successive, oppressive prosecutions, or in which a judge exer-
cises his authority to help the prosecution, at a trial in which Its case Is
going badly, by affording it another, more favorable opportunity to convict
the accused." Id. at 369.
17. In Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), a mistrial had been
declared without the consent of the defendant when the prosecution could
not make out a case due to its inability to locate key witnesses. The United
States Supreme Court, in reversing the Fifth Circuit, held that while the
absence of witnesses may justify the declaration of a mistrial under certain
circumstances, such Is not the case where the mistrial order Is Intended
to afford the prosecution another opportunity to present its case properly.
See also Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931).
The line of reasoning In Downum seemed to Indicate a departure from
the wide discretion allowed in Gori, but Downum may be viewed as an
example of a trial judge unfairly aiding the prosecution in securing a more
favorable opportunity to convict the accused.
It was apparent in United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), decided in
the following year, that Gori was still in full effect. While Tateo did not
specifically deal with a mistrial declared without the consent of the defen-
dant, it is Indicative of the mood of the Court in this area. The defendant's
guilty plea in the first trial was coerced by the trial judge, yet the Court
held that the defendant could be retried without violating the guarantee
against double joepardy. The Court relied on Gori, stating that the defendant
had not suffered any prejudice in the original proceedings.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
In United States v. Jorn the Supreme Court announced a
new policy involving greater scrutiny of a trial judge's declara-
tion of a mistrial without the consent of the defendant. The Court
rejected the reasoning in Gori, stating that:
"[a]n appellate court's assessment of which side benefited
from the mistrial ruling does not adequately satisfy the
policies underpinning the double jeopardy provision. Re-
prosecution after a mistrial has been unnecessarily declared
by the trial court obviously subjects the defendant to the
same personal strain and insecurity regardless of the moti-
vation underlying the trial judge's action."' 8
No reason was found to doubt that the trial judge was acting in
good faith to insure that the trial was being conducted properly,
yet the fact remained that the accused was unnecessarily put in
jeopardy twice, regardless of the actual intentions of the trial
judge. The record indicated that there was substantial reason
to believe that the witnesses had been adequately warned of
their constitutional rights 9 and that, in any event, a continuance
would have sufficed to remedy any deficiencies in the warnings.
These factors led the Court to conclude that the trial judge had
made no effort to assure that there was a manifest necessity for
the declaration of the mistrial. In these circumstances, reprose-
cution of the defendant would have violated the double jeopardy
provision of the fifth amendment.20
The effect of the decision in Jorn is to limit substantially the
discretion a trial judge has to declare a mistrial without the
consent of the defendant. While the traditional circumstances
in which a mistrial may be declared without the consent of the
defendant (such as inability of the jury to agree, jury bias, or
physical necessity) appear to be unaffected by the Jorn ruling,
it is clear that a mistrial declared without the defendant's consent
in any other situation is likely to trigger double jeopardy,
18. United States v. Jorn, 91 S. St. 547, 556 (1971).
19. The first taxpayer called by the government stated that he had been
warned of his rights, and the prosecuting attorney indicated that each of
the five witnesses had been advised of his rights upon initial contact. The
trial judge expressed the opinion that they had probably not been warned
at all, and that if they had been, the warnings were probably inadequate.
In response to questioning by the trial judge, the prosecuting attorney
attempted to state that he had no intention of presenting the government's
case in a manner calculated to implicate the taxpayers, but he was cut
short by the trial judge who abruptly declared a mistrial.
20. United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 558 (1971).
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especially where the declaration is not made for the benefit of
the accused. 21 Therefore, a mistrial declared in order to aid the
prosecution in presenting its case2 1 or to protect witnesses, as
in Jorn,m is not ordinarily permissible. The guarantee against
double jeopardy not only prevents a defendant from being sub-
jected unnecessarily to the ordeal of repeated prosecutions, but
also safeguards his option to go to the first jury from whom he
might receive a favorable judgment.24 A mistrial declared with-
out the defendant's consent for the benefit of any party other
21. This is not to say that a mistrial declared for the benefit of the
defendant will automatically permit retrial for the offense. See note 18 aupra
and accompanying text. It does mean, however, that mistrial declared
without the defendant's consent for the benefit of another party to the
proceeding carries a strong presumption that retrial will be precluded.
Such a mistrial is not likely to be considered of such necessity as to warrant
the foreclosure of the defendant's option to go to the first jury.
22. "The trial judge must recognize that lack of preparedness by the
Government to continue the trial directly implicates policies underpinning
both the double jeopardy provision and the speedy trial guarantee." United
States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 557-58 (1971). See also Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734 (1963); Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931).
23. "(lit seems reasonably clear from the trial record here that the
judge's insistence on stopping the trial until the witnesses were properly
warned was motivated by the desire to protect the witnesses rather than
the defendant." 91 S. Ct. 547, 556 (1971).
It is not entirely clear, however, whether the Court based its decision
on the fact that the order was for the benefit of witnesses rather than in
favor of the defendant, or whether it was because the mistrial declaration
was obviously not necessary to protect the rights of the witnesses. The better
view would seem to be that the Court took both of these factors into
consideration in arriving at its decision. The Court was obviously disturbed
with the trial judge's conduct in declaring a mistrial when it was so
clearly unnecessary to achieve its avowed end. But there is also language
in the majority opinion to indicate that the Court felt a mistrial declared
for the purpose of protecting witnesses in itself raised double jeopardy
questions. A recurrent theme throughout the Jorn ruling is the necessity
of not foreclosing the defendant's option to go to the first jury which he
may believe will render a favorable verdict. This indicates that the Court
is establishing more than simply a recognition that the guarantee against
double jeopardy serves to protect the accused from the harassment of
repeated prosecutions.
24. "[I1n the final analysis, the judge must always temper the decision
whether or not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the
defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation
with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be
favorably disposed to his fate .... Id. at 558.
"[Elven in circumstances where the problem reflects error on the part
of one counsel or the other, the trial judge must still take care to assure
himself that the situation warrants action on his part foreclosing the
defendant from a potentially favorable judgment by the tribunal." Id. at 557.
"[T]he crucial difference between reprosecution after appeal by the
defendant (from a conviction] and reprosecution after a sua sponte judicial
mistrial declaration is that in the first situation the defendant has not been
deprived of his option to go to the first jury .... On the other hand, where
the judge, acting without the defendant's consent, aborts the proceeding,
the defendant has been deprived of his 'valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal."' Id.
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than the defendant obviously conflicts with this right of the
accused to have his case tried before the jury first impaneled.
In cases where the mistrial has been ordered for the benefit
of the defendant, there is a greater likelihood that retrial will
not be prohibited. But, as the Court in Jorn pointed out in
rejecting the reasoning of Gori, the question of which party
benefited from the mistrial order is not alone sufficient to deter-
mine whether retrial is to be precluded.25 The trial judge's
exercise of discretion in discharging the jury must still be ex-
amined in light of the manifest necessity criteria of United States
v. Perez, as construed and applied in Jorn. Under the Jorn
interpretation, any mistrial declared without the defendant's
consent, in situations other than those traditionally held to
permit retrial, must be considered suspect. The end result is to
move towards the position that the double jeopardy provision of
the fifth amendment is an absolute command that a defendant be
allowed to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, and
that this command can be avoided only in the most limited and
compelling circumstances.
The double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment was
made applicable to state criminal proceedings in Benton v. Mary-
land,26 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the
double jeopardy prohibition represents a fundamental ideal in
our constitutional heritage and must apply to the states through
the fourteenth amendmentY The Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure provides rules governing those situations in which a
trial judge's declaration of a mistrial will either permit or
preclude retrial. Article 59128 defines double jeopardy and states
that double jeopardy will preclude retrial where a mistrial is
declared without the consent of the defendant, and where such
declaration does not fall within one of the enumerations of article
25. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
26. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
27. The guarantee against twice being put in jeopardy is also incorpo-
rated in LA. CONST. art. I, § 9: "[NIor shall any person be twice put in jeo-
pardy of life or liberty for the same offense, except on his own application
for a new trial, or where there is a mistrial, or a motion in arrest of judg-
ment is sustained."
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 591: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of life or liberty for the same offense, except, when on his own motion, a
new trial has been granted or judgment has been arrested, or where there
has been a mistrial legally ordered under the provisions of Article 775 or
ordered with the express consent of the defendant."
[Vol. 32
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775. Article 77529 specifies those situations in which a mistrial
may be declared without breaching the guarantee against double
jeopardy. These situations are essentially the same as those
which the United States Supreme Court has traditionally held
to justify the declaration of a mistrial without the defendant's
consent. In light of the restricted interpretation of "manifest
necessity" applied in Jorn, article 775 should cover virtually
every situation in which a mistrial can validly be declared.30 It
should be noted, however, that article 775 must necessarily be
read in light of the "manifest necessity" requirement of Jorn, the
latter obviously controlling should there be a conflict between
the two.
Carl Grant Schlueter
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 1592 TO THE STATUTORY WILL
A statutory will, which named the plaintiff the universal
legatee, was declared formally invalid on the ground that the
plaintiff had acted as one of the two attesting witnesses, contrary
29. Id. art. 775: "A mistrial may be ordered, and in a jury case the jury
dismissed, when:
"(1) The defendant consents thereto;
"(2) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict;
"(3) There is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make anyjudgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law;
"(4) The court finds that the defendant does not have the mental ca-
pacity to proceed;
"(5) It is physically Impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with law; or
"(6) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
"Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury
case the jury dismissed, when prejudical conduct in or outside the courtroom
makes it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial, or when au-
thorized by Article 770 or 771.
"A mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed, when
the state and the defendant jointly move for a mistrial."
30. The categories of article 775 provide certainty in the existing guide-
lines as to ordering a mistrial, but the inflexible nature of this article may
pose problems. One such problem is that it is impossible to define all of the
circumstances in which it may become necessary to declare a mistrial with-
out the consent of the defendant. Thus there may arise situations in which
it would be advisable to declare a mistrial without the defendant's consent,
yet which may not fit into any of the circumstances listed in Article 775. In
such an event a mistrial would be invalid under article 775, and article 591
would preclude retrial for the offense.
One such situation which article 775 would not cover is when a mistrial
must be declared without the defendant's consent due to prejudicial con-
duct within or without the courtroom. It is well settled that bias and prej-
udicial conduct may justify a mistrial in certain circumstances, yet article
775 states that such a mistrial may be declared only upon motion of the
defendant.
